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7.Epistemic	  Dexterity:	  A	  Ramseyian	  Account	  	  Of	  Agent	  Based	  Knoweldge1	  Abrol	  Fairweather	  (SFSU)	  &	  Carlos	  Montemayor	  (SFSU)	  	  I.	  Introduction:	  Metaphysical	  Epistemology	  	   Virtue	  epistemology	  is	  widely	  known	  as	  a	  deeply	  normative	  form	  of	  epistemology,	  and	  indeed	  it	  is2.	  	  However,	  less	  attention	  has	  been	  given	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  also	  deeply	  metaphysical	  and	  empirically	  committed3.	  Two	  metaphysical	  projects	  within	  virtue	  theory	  that	  will	  be	  discussed	  at	  length	  below	  involve	  (a)	  
individuating	  disposition	  types	  and	  (b)	  providing	  an	  account	  of	  the	  because	  of	  relation	  that	  must	  obtain	  between	  an	  agent	  and	  their	  epistemic	  success	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  states	  of	  knowledge.	  	  Regarding	  disposition	  types,	  one	  well	  known	  challenge	  to	  process	  reliabilism	  is	  the	  Generality	  Problem	  (Feldman	  1998).	  	  This	  is	  a	  challenge	  to	  properly	  individuate	  processes	  that	  has	  proven	  difficult	  for	  standard	  reliabilism,	  but	  	  virtue	  epistemology	  would	  appear	  to	  give	  us	  a	  principled	  way	  to	  distinguish	  the	  processes	  that	  matter,	  namely	  those	  that	  constitute	  (or	  are	  elements	  of)	  epistemic	  virtues.	  	  But,	  a	  virtue	  epistemologist	  will	  then	  need	  a	  nuanced	  dispositional	  taxonomy	  to	  ground	  solid	  responses	  to	  generality	  type	  worries	  and	  to	  claim	  any	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1 	  An	   earlier	   version	   of	   this	   paper	   was	   presented	   at	   the	   “naturalized	   virtue	  epistemology”	  session	  of	  the	  Pacific	  APA,	  2012	  meeting,	  by	  one	  of	  us,	  and	  then	  at	  a	  workshop	   on	   mind	   and	   epistemology	   at	   UNAM.	   We	   are	   grateful	   for	   comments	  received	  in	  those	  sessions.	  2	  See	  Zagzebski	  1996,	  Riggs	  2008,	  Pritchard	  Sosa	  2010	  and	  many	  others	  for	  the	  normative	  dimension	  of	  VE.	  3	  See	  contributions	  from	  Ram	  Neta	  and	  Peter	  Graham	  in	  this	  volume	  for	  an	  overtly	  metaphysical	  virtue	  theory,	  as	  well	  as	  David	  Copp	  and	  Allan	  Hazlett	  in	  this	  volume	  for	  overtly	  semantic	  approaches.	  	  
advantage	  over	  process	  reliabilism	  on	  this	  score.	  	  In	  virtue	  ethics,	  virtues	  are	  usually	  associated	  with	  character	  traits,	  but	  virtue	  epistemologists	  refer	  to	  a	  greater	  range	  of	  disposition	  types:	  	  Sosa	  goes	  for	  faculties	  (1991),	  competences	  (2007)	  and	  most	  recently	  dispositions	  related	  to	  action,	  agency	  and	  risk	  assessment.	  	  Greco	  (1993)	  appeals	  to	  skills	  and	  abilities	  (2010),	  Zagzebski	  (1996)	  and	  Baehr	  (2011)	  use	  traditional	  Aristotelian	  character	  traits,	  and	  all	  of	  these	  broad	  dispositional	  kinds	  have	  a	  range	  of	  narrower	  instances.	  	  While	  we	  can	  see	  a	  competing	  metaphysics	  of	  virtue	  epistemology	  here,	  each	  account	  is	  articulating	  some	  form	  of	  disposition.	  	  Dispositions	  are	  the	  basic	  metaphysical	  category	  at	  work	  in	  virtue	  theoretic	  epistemology4.	  	  	  Regarding	  the	  because	  of	  relation,	  this	  is	  essential	  to	  the	  success	  of	  virtue	  epistemology	  in	  addressing	  both	  the	  Value	  Problem	  with	  accounts	  of	  agent	  credit	  for	  true	  belief	  and	  Gettier	  Problems	  by	  properly	  connecting	  an	  agent	  to	  their	  achievements	  in	  ways	  that	  (seem	  to)	  preclude	  the	  special	  mix	  of	  good	  luck	  and	  bad	  luck	  that	  generate	  Gettier	  type	  problems5.	  	  The	  requirement	  that	  a	  success	  be	  sufficiently	  ‘due	  to’	  the	  virtue	  in	  the	  agent	  engenders	  a	  commitment	  to	  causal-­‐explanatory	  facts	  connecting	  an	  agent	  to	  their	  successful	  outcomes	  through	  the	  
exercise	  of	  an	  ability.6	  While	  the	  intuition	  is	  clear	  and	  promising,	  an	  adequate	  account	  of	  what	  it	  is	  for	  an	  epistemically	  assessable	  state	  of	  an	  agent	  to	  be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Since	  not	  all	  dispositions	  are	  virtues,	  a	  “dispositionalist	  epistemology”	  need	  not	  be	  virtue	  theoretic.	  Any	  virtue	  epistemology	  will	  be	  metaphysically	  dispositionalist	  in	  a	  broad	  sense,	  as	  motivational	  elements	  are	  often	  construed	  dispositionally	  in	  more	  internalist	  accounts	  of	  virtue.	  	  5	  See	  Pritchard	  (2012)	  for	  an	  argument	  that	  virtue	  epistemology	  alone	  cannot	  achieve	  both,	  and	  must	  appeal	  to	  an	  independent	  anti-­‐luck	  condition.	  6	  See	  Greco	  &	  Groff	  2013	  on	  the	  “new	  Aristotelianism”.	  
sufficiently	  due	  to	  the	  abilities	  of	  the	  agent	  has	  been	  elusive.	  Getting	  clear	  on	  the	  
because	  of	  relation	  is	  necessary	  for	  any	  account	  of	  properly	  manifesting	  an	  epistemic	  virtue,	  and	  thus	  for	  any	  virtue	  epistemology	  with	  a	  robust	  commitment	  to	  a	  metaphysics	  of	  dispositions.	  	  Since	  virtue	  epistemology	  is	  agent	  based,	  causal	  explanatory	  facts	  connecting	  an	  agent	  to	  their	  successful	  outcomes	  will	  involve	  some	  form	  of	  epistemic	  agency,	  motivation,	  or	  other	  “agent	  level”	  states	  with	  causal	  salience	  in	  success7.	  	  These	  are	  largely	  metaphysical	  issues,	  and	  they	  constitute	  a	  certain	  conceptual	  core	  of	  virtue	  epistemology.	  	  Consider	  Duncan	  Pritchard’s	  (2012)	  claim	  that	  there	  are	  two	  “master”	  intuitions	  about	  what	  turns	  true	  belief	  into	  knowledge:	  	  	  (a)	  The	  ability	  intuition:	  	  knowledge	  requires	  cognitive	  ability,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  
when	  one	  knows	  one’s	  cognitive	  success	  should	  be	  the	  product	  of	  one’s	  cognitive	  
ability.	  
(b)	  The	  anti-­‐luck	  condition:	  when	  one	  knows	  one’s	  cognitive	  success	  (i.e.,	  one’s	  
believing	  truly)	  is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  luck.	  
The	  ability	  Intuition	  (hereafter	  just	  ABILITY)	  tells	  us	  that	  a	  true	  belief	  is	  well	  formed	  when	  “it	  is	  the	  product	  of	  a	  cognitive	  ability,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  when	  one	  knows	  one’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  all	  elements	  of	  epistemic	  virtues	  must	  be	  person-­‐level	  states,	  just	  that	  the	  necessary	  conditions	  for	  knowledge	  will	  non-­‐trivially	  refer	  to	  some	  person-­‐level	  states	  involved	  in	  cognitive	  achievements.	  	  Implicit	  knowledge	  clearly	  plays	  important	  roles	  in	  action	  selection	  and	  other	  person-­‐level	  activities.	  We	  claim	  only	  that	  some	  agent-­‐level	  states	  must	  play	  some	  significant	  causal	  explanatory	  states	  in	  order	  for	  any	  virtue	  epistemology	  to	  be	  truly	  ‘agent	  based’	  rather	  than	  ‘belief	  based’.	  
cognitive	  success	  should	  be	  the	  product	  of	  one’s	  cognitive	  ability.”	  (Pritchard	  2012).	  	  Any	  skill	  or	  ability	  is	  a	  disposition	  to	  do	  something	  reliably,	  and	  thus	  ABILITY	  is	  essential	  to	  any	  reliabilist	  virtue	  epistemology.	  	  The	  anti-­‐luck	  condition	  (hereafter	  just	  LUCK)	  requires	  that	  cognitive	  dispositions	  must	  be	  suitably	  integrated	  with	  the	  agent’s	  other	  belief	  forming	  dispositions	  “if	  we	  are	  to	  think	  of	  these	  dispositions	  as	  genuinely	  reflecting	  the	  agent’s	  cognitive	  agency.”	  (Pritchard,	  ibid).	  	  	  ABILITY	  and	  LUCK	  appear	  to	  be	  two	  faces	  of	  a	  single	  intuition,	  since	  any	  cognitive	  success	  achieved	  from	  ability	  will	  typically	  not	  be	  a	  success	  due	  to	  luck.	  However,	  Pritchard	  argues	  that	  this	  is	  actually	  false	  because	  “these	  two	  intuitions	  in	  fact	  impose	  independent	  epistemic	  demands	  on	  our	  theory	  of	  knowledge,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  only	  once	  one	  recognizes	  this	  fact	  that	  one	  can	  offer	  a	  successful	  resolution	  of	  the	  analytical	  project.”	  (Pritchard,	  ibid.)	  	  Pritchard	  argues	  that	  virtue	  epistemology	  nicely	  provides	  for	  the	  ability	  condition,	  but	  cannot	  offer	  an	  adequate	  anti-­‐luck	  condition	  and	  is	  thus	  not	  a	  self-­‐standing	  general	  epistemology.	  	  	  
While	  Sosa	  and	  Greco	  do	  not	  accept	  Pritchard’s	  conclusion,	  they	  recognize	  similar	  core	  demands	  for	  virtue	  epistemology.	  	  Greco	  (2010)	  defines	  knowledge	  as	  a	  certain	  form	  of	  success	  from	  ability,	  and	  Sosa	  (2007)	  defines	  knowledge	  as	  a	  certain	  form	  of	  apt	  performance.	  	  The	  common	  project	  uniting	  these	  (and	  arguably	  all)	  virtue	  epistemologists	  is	  to	  properly	  understand	  the	  nature	  of	  cognitive	  abilities	  and	  their	  explanatory	  role	  in	  epistemic	  success.	  	  Differences	  between	  virtue	  epistemologists	  emerge	  in	  deciding	  what	  to	  include	  in	  the	  disposition	  types	  we	  are	  to	  call	  epistemic	  virtues,	  what	  forms	  of	  epistemic	  success	  to	  recognize	  and	  the	  different	  ways	  the	  former	  might	  sufficiently	  explain	  the	  latter.	  This	  is	  the	  core	  
project	  of	  virtue	  epistemology,	  at	  least	  on	  the	  metaphysical	  side.	  There	  might	  be	  some	  concerns	  about	  pursuing	  this	  kind	  of	  metaphysically	  thick	  virtue	  theory	  in	  epistemology.	  Pritchard	  argues	  that	  the	  core	  project	  cannot	  succeed	  without	  borrowing	  essential	  elements	  from	  outside	  of	  virtue	  theory,	  while	  Sosa	  and	  Greco	  have	  accounts	  that	  aspire	  to	  achieve	  precisely	  this,	  but	  which	  face	  difficulties	  of	  their	  own	  in	  the	  process.	  	  	  	  
We	  seek	  a	  novel	  guide	  here	  in	  F.P.	  Ramsey’s	  (1927)	  “success	  semantics”,	  initially	  proposed	  as	  a	  theory	  of	  truth	  rather	  than	  knowledge	  by	  Ramsey,	  and	  recently	  for	  mental	  content	  by	  Bence	  Nanay	  (2012).	  	  	  We	  propose	  modifications	  to	  Ramsey’s	  success	  semantics	  that	  are	  amenable	  to	  naturalistic	  analysis	  and	  which	  addresses	  the	  core	  project	  of	  virtue	  epistemology	  described	  above	  in	  ways	  that	  avoids	  problems	  facing	  both	  Sosa	  and	  Greco’s	  accounts.	  	  	  The	  Ramseyian	  account	  is	  especially	  fruitful	  as	  an	  account	  of	  epistemic	  agency	  and	  nicely	  unifies	  a	  number	  of	  disparate	  and	  at	  times	  unstable	  areas	  in	  virtue	  epistemology.	  	  We	  argue	  that	  a	  
modified	  success	  semantics	  provides	  a	  naturalistic	  grounding	  for	  the	  core	  project	  of	  
virtue	  epistemology.	  	  	  Below	  we	  examine	  John	  Greco’s	  recent	  account	  of	  the	  “success	  from	  ability”	  defended	  in	  Knowledge	  and	  Achievement.	  	  While	  we	  agree	  with	  much	  of	  Greco’s	  account,	  and	  it	  is	  perhaps	  the	  most	  plausible	  current	  version	  of	  virtue	  reliabilism,	  his	  contextualism	  about	  causal	  salience	  creates	  a	  problematic	  rift	  between	  the	  metaphysical	  and	  normative	  aspects	  of	  his	  theory.	  	  We	  diagnose	  the	  problem	  facing	  Greco	  below,	  and	  then	  defend	  an	  improved	  account	  drawing	  on	  Ramsey’s	  success	  semantics.	  
II.	  	  Greco,	  dispositions	  &	  norms	  in	  virtue	  epistemology	  	  	  In	  his	  recent	  book,	  John	  Greco	  (2010)	  proposes	  a	  reliabilist	  virtue	  epistemology	  for	  knowledge	  that	  explicitly	  requires	  that	  the	  abilities	  of	  agents	  serve	  as	  the	  causes	  of	  their	  epistemic	  achievements.	  Greco’s	  focus	  on	  “success	  from	  ability”	  as	  the	  driving	  image	   for	   epistemic	   inquiry	   is	   also	   seen	   in	   Sosa	   (2007),	   Pritchard	   (2012),	   Turri	  (2011)	  and	  others,	  and	  thus	  captures	  a	  unifying	  intuition	  for	  a	  number	  of	  important	  perspectives	   in	   epistemology.	   	   	   Greco	   also	   has	   one	   of	   the	   most	   thorough	   virtue	  theoretic	  accounts	  when	   it	  comes	   to	   the	  semantic	  and	  psychological	  underpinnings	  of	   reliabilist	   virtue	   epistemology.	   In	   this	   section,	   we	   critically	   assess	   some	   of	   the	  psychological	   and	   semantic	   commitments	   of	   Greco’s	   account	   and	   provide	   an	  alternative	  proposal	   that,	   like	  Greco’s,	  will	   ground	  epistemic	   assessment	   in	   agent-­‐level	  mental	   states	   in	   the	   context	   of	   action,	   but	   requires	  more	   robust	   causal	   and	  motivational	   connections	   between	   an	   agent	   and	   their	   successful	   outcomes	   than	  Greco.	   	   This	   account	   shows	   all	   the	   merits	   of	   Greco’s	   (2010)	   theory	   without	   the	  problematic	  assumptions	  discussed	  below.	  	  In	  the	  process,	  we	  will	  introduce	  a	  new	  name	  to	  contemporary	  virtue	  epistemology,	  Frank	  Ramsey.	   	  One	  promising	  aspect	  of	  Ramsey’s	  emphasis	  on	  action	  rather	  than	  beliefs	  or	  propositional	  attitudes	  is	  that	  it	  offers	  the	  reliabilist	  a	  nice	  way	  to	  partially	  achieve	  responsibilist	  epistemic	  aims.	  Ramsey	   (1931)	   was	   the	   first	   person	   to	   espouse	   reliabilism,	   but	   did	   not	   have	  opportunity	   to	   develop	   the	   idea.	   	   Combining	   this	   reliabilist	   commitment	   with	   a	  suitably	   modified	   “success	   semantics”	   provides	   a	   powerful	   account	   of	   epistemic	  
virtue,	   and	   promises	   to	   provide	   a	   naturalistic	   way	   of	   “thickening”	   standard	  reliabilism.	   	   	   Success	   semantics	   is	   an	   ‘action	   first’	   form	   of	   assessment	   that	   nicely	  unifies	  contexts,	  interests,	  motives	  and	  abilities	  in	  a	  dispositionalist	  framework	  and	  holds	  greater	  promise	  than	  Greco’s	  contextualist	  account	  discussed	  below.	  	  Greco	  construes	  the	  ‘because	  of’	  relation	  in	  terms	  of	  causal	  explanatory	  salience	  and	  insists	  that	  the	  semantics	  must	  be	  of	  the	  subject-­‐sensitive	  contextualist	  sort.	  In	  particular,	   Greco	   proposes	   that	   practical	   interests	   will	   specify	   which	   features	   of	   a	  
situation	  are	  explanatorily	  salient	  in	  the	  production	  of	  true	  belief.	  	  These	  features	  will	  show	  a	  range	  of	  agent-­‐responsibility,	  but	  also	  worrisome	  departures	  from	  abilities	  and	   virtues.	   	   If	   the	   practical	   interests	   that	   determine	   explanatory	   salience	   do	   not	  happen	   to	   give	   priority	   to	   abilities	   over	   environments	   in	   a	   given	   case,	   then	   the	  success	  cannot	  be	  knowledge.	  This	  is	  a	  different	  way	  of	  shifting	  the	  context	  because	  here	   the	   stakes	   are	   not	   shifting	   the	   standards	   for	   determining	   whether	   our	  reasoning	  was	  rigorous	  enough,	  but	  now	  on	  whether	  the	  achievement	  was	  ‘”causal	  enough”,	   so	   to	   speak.	   	   Greco	   is	   quite	   clear	   that	   his	   contextualism	   is	   for	   causal	  salience,	  not	  stakes	  and	  standards.	   	  While	  this	  route	  has	  some	  advantages	  for	  fully	  deliberate	  knowledge,	  there	  is	  a	  lot	  of	  knowledge	  that	  should	  not	  be	  as	  variable	  as	  Greco	  would	  have	  it	  under	  contextualist	  readings	  of	  causal	  salience.	  	  	  How	  is	  it	  that	  context,	  interests,	  purposes	  and	  the	  abilities	  of	  agents	  fit	  together	  into	   an	   account	   of	   epistemic	   virtue?	   Greco	   says	   that	   the	   contexts	   relevant	   for	   the	  evaluation	  of	  causal	  explanatory	  salience	  are	  	  ‘practical	  environments.’	  For	  instance,	  to	  determine	  that	  someone	  is	  a	  good	  baseball	  player	  one	  needs	  to	  specify	  what	  kind	  of	   practical	   considerations	   are	   relevant.	   Is	   the	   player	   participating	   in	   the	   major	  
leagues	   or	   a	   neighborhood	   game?	   The	   causal	   etiology	   of	   belief	   must	   be	   fully	  specified	  by	  the	  abilities	  of	  the	  agent,	  but	  in	  order	  to	  specify	  such	  etiology	  there	  will	  be	   practical	   considerations	   that	   will	   determine	   whether	   or	   not	   such	   abilities	   are	  causally	  salient.	  Greco	  says:	  	  	  	   In	  cases	  of	  knowledge,	  S	  believes	  the	  truth	  because	  S	  believes	  from	  intellectual	  ability	  –	  S’s	  believing	   the	   truth	   is	   explained	   by	   S’s	   believing	   from	   ability.	   But	   the	   success	   of	   this	  explanation	   requires	  more	   than	   that	   ability	   is	   involved.	   It	   requires	   that	   S’s	   ability	   has	   an	  appropriate	  level	  of	  explanatory	  salience.	  (Greco,	  2010,	  75)	  	  Greco	  admits	  that	  his	  account	  of	  explanatory	  salience	  in	  terms	  of	  causal	  relevance	  is	  far	   from	  being	   a	   detailed	   account	   of	   the	   etiological	   basis	   of	   knowledge	   because	   it	  does	   not	   offer	   a	   theory	   of	   causal	   explanation	   or	   the	   pragmatics	   of	   causal	  explanation-­‐language,	  which	  he	  says,	  are	  poorly	  understood	  in	  general.	  Nonetheless,	  he	  argues	  that,	  although	  sketchy	  and	  provisional,	  his	  account	  can	  solve	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  traditional	  difficulties	  in	  epistemology	  (e.g.,	  Gettier	  problems,	  Barn	  façade	  cases,	  etc.).	  	  The	  strategy	  to	  answer	  questions	  regarding	  lucky	  or	  accidental	  true	  belief	   is	  to	  emphasize	   that	   the	  agent’s	  abilities	  are	  not	   the	  direct	  cause	  of	   the	  belief	   (they	  are	  not	  causally	  and	  explanatory	  salient	  in	  the	  production	  of	  such	  belief).	  The	  absence	  of	  the	  abilities	  as	   causes	   rules	  out	  knowledge	  attribution	  or	  epistemic	   responsibility.	  Greco	  connects	  all	  these	  ideas	  as	  follows:	  	  
What	   does	   all	   this	   have	   to	   do	   with	   contextualism?	   In	   short,	   the	   present	   thesis	   is	   that	  knowledge	   attributions	   are	   a	   kind	   of	   credit	   attribution,	   and	   that	   credit	   attributions	   in	  general	   involve	   causal	   explanations:	  To	   say	   that	   a	   person	   S	   is	   creditable	   for	   some	   state	   of	  affairs	  A,	  is	  to	  say	  that	  S’s	  agency	  is	  salient	  in	  an	  explanation	  regarding	  how	  or	  why	  A	  came	  about.	  Now	  add	  a	  further,	  plausible	  thesis:	  that	  the	  semantics	  of	  causal	  explanation	  language	  requires	  a	  contextualist	  treatment.	  (Greco,	  2010,	  105-­‐106)	  	  This	   is	   certainly	   a	   theoretically	   plausible	   account	   of	   epistemic	   virtue.	   It	   has	  many	  advantages,	   as	   Greco’s	   book	   makes	   clear.	   But	   one	   may	   have	   concerns	   about	   the	  contextualist	   commitments	   of	   the	   proposal,	   particularly	   with	   respect	   to	   causal	  
explanations	   and	   the	   notion	   of	   ‘practical	   environment.’	   More	   specifically,	   the	  saliencies	  entailed	  by	  practical	   interests	  of	  agents	  may	  not	  match	  neatly	  (or	  at	  all)	  with	  the	  type	  of	  considerations	  that	  are	  usually	  salient	  in	  causal	  explanations.	  Some	  practical	  environments	  may	  make	  the	  agent’s	  motivations	  salient	  more	  than	  others,	  although	   presumably	   the	   agent’s	   causal	   relevance	   will	   be	   an	   invariant	   feature	   of	  these	  contexts	  where	  practical	  interests	  and	  the	  motivations	  of	  the	  agent	  will	  vary.	  If	  this	   is	   the	   case,	  which	  of	   the	   contexts	   should	  we	  pick?	  We	  will	   argue	   that	  Greco’s	  account	   is	   inadequate	   to	   answer	   this	   question	   because	   it	   parses	   the	   semantically	  relevant	   features	   for	   the	  evaluation	  of	   epistemic	  virtue	   too	   coarsely.	  The	  question	  that	  has	  broad	  implications	  for	  naturalized	  virtue	  epistemology	  is	  whether	  the	  right	  solution	   for	   a	   reliabilist	   can	   also	   account	   for	   the	   epistemic	   value	   of	   an	   agent’s	  motivations	  that	  responsibilists	  often	  make	  central	  to	  epistemic	  evaluation.	  	  There	  are	  two	  aspects	  of	  Greco’s	  account	  that	  make	  it	  particularly	  problematic.	  One	   is	   the	   role	   given	   to	   the	   practical	   environment,	   which	   is	   not	   how	   causal	  
explanation	  is	  construed	  in	  general,	  at	  least	  not	  from	  a	  naturalistic	  point	  of	  view.	  	  It	  seems	   that	   Greco’s	   move	   is	   justified	   by	   the	   unique	   type	   of	   cause	   that	   epistemic	  virtues	   require:	   agents,	   rather	   than	   generic	   physical	   events	   (or	   even	   sub-­‐personal	  components	  of	   the	  agent	   that	   are	  not	   cognitively	   integrated).	  But	   then,	  why	   insist	  that	  it	  is	  the	  semantics	  of	  causal	  explanation	  that	  matters?	  Either	  it	  is	  robust	  causal	  explanation	  (as	  understood	  in	  metaphysics	  and	  philosophy	  of	  science)	  that	  matters	  or	  it	  is	  a	  more	  practically	  oriented,	  folk	  understanding	  of	  the	  salience	  of	  an	  event	  in	  producing	  an	  effect	   (a	   folk	   theory	  of	  causality)	   that	  matters.	   	  We	  will	  argue	  that	   it	  cannot	   be	   either	   because	   they	   compromise	   the	   psychological	   plausibility	   of	   the	  resulting	   success	   attributions.	   An	   advantage	   of	   the	   Ramsey	   inspired	   semantics	  examined	   in	  section	   IV	   is	   that	   it	  explicitly	   incorporates	  a	  psychologically	  plausible	  restriction	  on	  knowledge	  attributions.	  	  The	  other	  problematic	   aspect	  of	  Greco’s	  proposal	   is	   that	   the	   causal	   salience	  of	  abilities	   on	   his	   account	   can	   be	   entirely	   unrelated	   to	   the	   motivational	   cognitive	  processes	  of	  the	  agent.	  While	  this	   is	  a	  worry	  for	  simple	  reliabilism,	  Greco	  is	  aware	  that	  motivation	  and	  some	  form	  of	  subjective	  justification	  is	  an	  important	  ingredient	  of	   a	   virtue	   theoretic	   account	   of	   knowledge.	   For	   this	   reason,	   he	   suggests	   that	   an	  Aristotelian	  model	  may	  be	  the	  best	  way	  to	  understand	  virtues	  in	  general:	  	   Now	  it	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  the	  Aristotelian	  model	  is	  the	  better	  one	  for	  theories	  of	  epistemic	  normativity.	  This	  is	  because,	  it	  seems	  to	  me,	  knowledge	  requires	  both	   responsibility	   in	   one’s	   cognitive	   conduct	   and	   reliability	   in	   achieving	  epistemic	   ends.	   But	   however	   this	   issue	   is	   decided,	   the	   main	   point	   is	   that	  
virtue	   theories	   define	   the	   normative	   properties	   of	   beliefs	   in	   terms	   of	   the	  normative	   properties	   of	   persons,	   i.e.	   the	   stable	   dispositions	   or	   character	  traits	   that	   constitute	   their	   intellectual	   virtues,	   however	   these	   are	   to	   be	  understood.	  (2010,	  43)	  	  This	  is	  a	  crucial	  issue	  concerning	  the	  psychological	  underpinnings	  of	  virtues,	  as	  well	  as	   the	   general	   theoretical	   implications	   of	   an	   adequate	   naturalized	   account	   of	  epistemic	   virtue.	   Evidently,	   without	   a	   detailed	   explanation	   of	   how	   the	   normative	  properties	  of	  persons	  (their	  stable	  epistemic	  dispositions)	  are	  included	  in	  the	  causal	  explanatory	   salience	   that	   Greco	   endorses	   for	   knowledge	   attribution,	   one	   cannot	  determine	   whether	   or	   not	   such	   attributions	   comport	   with	   epistemic	   norms	   as	  understood	  above.	  	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  we	  argue	  that	  no	  strictly	  causal	  account	  of	  the	  ‘because	  of’	  relation	   is	   sufficient	   to	   provide	   the	   explanation	   needed	   above.	   This	   becomes	   a	  problem	   for	   any	   naturalized	   virtue	   reliabilism	   that	   extends	   this	   commitment	   to	  explaining	   epistemic	   responsibility	   exclusively	   in	   terms	   of	   causal	   salience.	   To	   be	  clear,	  any	  naturalized	  version	  of	  epistemic	  virtue	  must	  appeal	  to	  causal	  explanation	  (e.g.,	  reliable	  belief	  forming	  process,	  stable	  dispositions	  to	  respond	  accurately	  given	  certain	   conditions,	   etc.).	  However,	   it	  must	   also	   explain	  how	   such	   explanations	   are	  compatible	  with	   a	   broad	   range	   of	   knowledge	   attributions	   that	   essentially	   include	  
motivational	   aspects	   of	   epistemic	   agency,	   such	   as	   conscientiousness	   and	   open-­‐mindedness.	  	  	  
Before	   proceeding,	   it	   is	   worth	   noting	   how	   explicit	   Greco	   is	   about	   the	  importance	  of	  responsibility	  for	  reliabilist	  accounts	  of	  epistemic	  virtue.	  He	  says	  that	  an	  agent	  S	  is	  epistemically	  responsible	  “if	  and	  only	  if	  S’s	  believing	  that	  p	  is	  properly	  motivated;	   if	   and	   only	   if	   S’s	   believing	   that	   p	   results	   from	   intellectual	   dispositions	  that	  S	  manifests	  when	  S	  is	  motivated	  to	  believe	  the	  truth.”	  (Greco,	  2010,	  43)	  He	  then	  defines	  epistemic	  virtue	  as	  follows:	  “S’s	  belief	  that	  p	  is	  epistemically	  virtuous	  if	  and	  only	  if	  both	  (a)	  S’s	  belief	  that	  p	  is	  epistemically	  responsible;	  and	  (b)	  S	  is	  objectively	  
reliable	   in	  believing	   that	  p.”	   (2010,	  43,	  our	  emphasis).	   It	   seems	   that	   the	  upshot	  of	  these	  definitions	   is	   this:	   suppose	   that	   two	  agents	  are	   identical	  with	   respect	   to	   the	  objective	  reliability	  of	  their	  cognitive	  processes.	  Every	  time	  they	  form	  a	  belief,	  they	  have	   the	   same	   degree	   of	   objective	   reliability	   (their	   beliefs	   have	   an	   identical	  likelihood	   of	   being	   more	   true	   than	   false). 8 	  Suppose	   one	   wants	   to	   attribute	  knowledge	  to	  these	  epistemic	  agents.	  Their	  being	  reliable	  is	  a	  big	  plus	  in	  their	  favor.	  But	   this	   is	   not	   enough	   for	   a	   reliabilist	   virtue	   epistemology.	   In	   assessing	   their	  epistemic	   deliverances	   and	   achievements,	   their	   abilities	   must	   be	   causally	   salient	  (i.e.,	   the	  agents	  must	   arrive	  at	   true	  belief	  because	  of	   their	   abilities).	  This	   is	  why	  a	  reliabilist	  virtue	  epistemology	  is	  much	  more	  fine	  grained	  than	  standard	  reliabilism.	  According	   to	   standard	   reliabilism,	   both	   agents	   are	   equally	   justified	   and	   if	   their	  beliefs	   equally	   comply	   with	   some	   safety	   or	   sensitivity	   constraint,	   then	   they	   both	  know.	  	  For	  any	  virtue	  epistemology,	  one	  also	  needs	  to	  show	  that	  the	  agent	  arrived	  at	  such	   beliefs	   because	   of	   their	   epistemic	   abilities,	   which	   will	   typically	   include	   the	  proper	   motivation	   to	   use	   those	   abilities.	   Thus,	   it	   is	   perfectly	   plausible	   to	   not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8 	  See	   Goldman	   (1992)	   for	   a	   classic	   account	   of	   the	   objective	   or	   scientifically	  constrained	  standards	  for	  the	  reliability	  of	  cognitive	  epistemic	  processes.	  
attribute	   knowledge	   to	   one	   or	   both	   of	   these	   agents,	   even	   though	   their	   beliefs	   are	  equally	  reliably	  produced.	  	  Now	  the	  worry	  is	  how	  we	  can	  include	  motivational	  states	  of	  the	  agent	  in	  an	  account	   of	   knowledge	   attribution	   that	   appeals	   exclusively	   to	   the	   (robust)	   causal	  salience	  of	  abilities?	  What	  we	  shall	  argue	  is	  that,	  since	  reliabilist	  virtue	  epistemology	  provides	   a	   more	   fine	   grained	   theory	   of	   knowledge	   attribution,	   the	   semantics	   for	  such	   attributions	   must	   not	   appeal	   exclusively	   to	   causal	   salience.	   Rather,	   the	  semantics	   for	   such	   attributions	   must	   be	   as	   fine	   grained	   as	   virtue	   theoretic	  achievements	   generally	   require,	   and	   will	   include,	   somehow,	   the	   motivational	  aspects	  of	  epistemic	  agents.	  	  For	  a	  naturalized	  virtue	  epistemology	  of	  the	  reliabilist	  kind	  it	  is	  particularly	  pressing	  to	  address	  this	  issue	  with	  psychological	  evidence.	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  next	  two	  sections	  is	  to	  provide	  the	  outlines	  of	  a	  reliabilist	  theory	  of	  epistemic	  virtue	  with	  a	  semantics	  that	  explicitly	  incorporates	  aims,	  motivations,	  and	  goals,	  and	  is	  based	  on	  the	  most	  recent	  psychological	  evidence.	  	  
III.	  Causality:	  folksy,	  metaphysical	  and	  psychologically	  constrained	  	  Greco’s	  explanatory	  salience	  contextualism	  does	  not	  really	  appeal	  to	  the	  motivations	  of	   the	   agent,	   rather	   it	   focuses	   exclusively	   on	   the	   contextually	   variable	   “causally	  relevant”	  factors	  of	  a	  situation,	  which	  might	  or	  might	  not	  include	  motivational	  states	  of	   the	   agent	   being	   assessed.	   One	   worry	   here	   is	   that	   agents	   are	   assessed	   at	   least	  partly	  on	  their	  motivations.	  At	  a	  minimum,	  an	  epistemically	  virtuous	  agent	  will	  not	  
having	   motivations	   contrary	   to	   the	   aim	   of	   belief	   (truth,	   knowledge),	   and	   this	   is	  especially	   true	   in	   attributions	   of	   credit-­‐based	   success.	   This	   element	   of	   epistemic	  assessment	   is	   clear	   when	   an	   agent	   has	   a	   defective	   motivation,	   say	   a	   desire	   for	  comforting	  beliefs	  rather	  than	  true	  beliefs.	  While	  this	  seems	  clear	  enough,	  properly	  understanding	   the	   ‘desire	   for	   truth’	  will	   be	   an	   important	   and	  perhaps	   challenging	  project	   for	   naturalized	   virtue	   epistemology,	   and	   specifically	   for	   the	   prospects	   of	  responsibilist	   virtue	   epistemology.	   	   We	   can	   only	   gesture	   at	   how	   the	   epistemic-­‐Ramsey-­‐success	   account	   defended	   here	   can	   properly	   locate	   the	   role	   of	   desires	   in	  responsibilist	  virtue,	  but	  we	  will	  do	  so	  in	  the	  concluding	  section.	  	  The	   examples	   offered	   by	   Greco	   concerning	   causal	   salience	   are	   aimed	   at	  illustrating	  the	  contextualist	  semantics	  he	  favors.	  Some	  of	  them	  are	  clearly	  based	  on	  practical	  considerations	  that	  the	  folk	  use	  to	  attribute	  knowledge	  based	  on	  abilities	  (such	   as	   the	   example	   of	   the	   gambler,	   his	  wife	   and	  his	   friends,	  who	  have	  different	  standards	  and	  practical	  interests	  regarding	  his	  alleged	  abilities	  for	  choosing	  winning	  horses).9	  Other	  examples	  concerning	  simple	  causal	  salience,	  rather	  than	  knowledge	  attribution,	   appeal	   to	   practical	   interests,	   but	   the	   context	   seems	   to	   be	   framed	   in	   a	  more	  metaphysical	  setting	  and	  the	  impression	  one	  gets	  from	  these	  examples	  is	  that	  they	   concern	   causality	   in	   the	   strict	   metaphysical	   sense,	   rather	   than	   causality	   as	  understood	  by	  the	  folk.	  	  For	   instance,	   Greco’s	   example	   concerning	   the	   car	   accident	   is	   presented	   in	  terms	  of	   two	  different	   standards	   for	   salience,	  both	  based	  on	  practical	   interests.	   In	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  One	  problem	  with	  this	  example	  is	  that	  the	  ability	  to	  succeed	  in	  gambling	  may	  not	  be	  an	  epistemic	  virtue	  at	  all,	  especially	  if	  one	  considers	  what	  is	  at	  stake	  in	  gambling	  (which	   includes	   risk	   and	   luck	   as	   defining	   features).	   But	  we	  will	   not	   focus	   on	   this	  problem	  here.	  
describing	  an	  accident	  scene,	  the	  cops	  focus	  on	  the	  high	  speed,	  and	  for	  them	  the	  high	  speed	  of	  the	  car	  is	  what	  is	  causally	  salient	  (the	  cause	  of	  the	  accident),	  while	  for	  city	  planners	  what	  is	  causally	  salient	  is	  the	  deficient	  design	  of	  the	  road.	  But	  clearly,	  the	  limits	   on	   what	   is	   causally	   salient	   in	   this	   example	   are	   very	   different	   from	   the	  plausible	  metaphysical	  or	  psychological	  limits	  concerning	  the	  gambler’s	  example.	  In	  the	  car	  accident	   case,	   the	  actual	   speed	  of	   the	  car	   is	  a	   lot	  more	   important	   than	   the	  interests	   of	   the	   cops	   and	   the	   actual	   design	   of	   the	   road	   is	   crucial	   for	   anything	   the	  planners	  have	  to	  say.	  	  What	   is	   causally	   salient	   about	   the	  accident,	   therefore,	  depends	  on	  objective	  
information	  that	  is	  preserved	  in	  the	  causal	  chain.10	  Absent	  one	  of	  the	  facts	  concerning	  road	   design	   or	   speed,	   the	   accident	   would	   not	   have	   happened.	   This	   sounds	   like	  metaphysical	   causality,	   dependent	   on	   facts	   that	   remain	   invariant	   across	   different	  interpretations	   based	   on	   practical	   interests.	   For	   example,	   at	   some	   point,	   one	   can	  imagine	  a	  judge	  asking:	  “I	  know	  that	  the	  road	  in	  question	  is	  in	  very	  bad	  shape	  and	  that	   the	   speed	   limit	   was	   crossed.	   But	   I	   want	   to	   know	   exactly	   why	   the	   accident	  happened?	  Which	  of	  these	  two	  salient	  features	  was	  objectively	  more	  relevant?”	  This	  is	   the	  kind	  of	  question	   that	   forensic	   scientists	  have	   to	  answer	  all	   the	   time.	  Robust	  causal	   salience	   requires	   objective	   relevance	   and	   information	   preservation,	   and	  some	  form	  of	  this	  will	  claim	  describe	  what	  it	  is	  to	  properly	  manifest	  a	  disposition11.	  	  One	  may	   think	   that	   forensic	   scientists	   bring	   new	   practical	   interests	   to	   the	  table.	  But	  notice	  that	  whatever	  interests	  they	  bring	  in,	  their	  assessment	  will	  be	  fact	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10 	  See	   Salmon,	   W.	   C.	   (1998)	   for	   discussion	   on	   the	   importance	   of	   objective	  information-­‐preservation	  in	  causal	  chains.	  11	  For	  a	  nice	  account	  of	  the	  distinction	  between	  ‘because	  of’	  and	  ‘manifesting’,	  see	  Turri	  (2011).	  
involving	   and	   constitutive	   of	   a	   causal	   chain.	   This	   is	   in	   sharp	   contrast	   with	   the	  gambler	   example.	   These	   incompatible	   attributions	   of	   knowledge	   based	   on	   the	  salience	   of	   the	   abilities	   of	   the	   gambler	   (or	   lack	   thereof)	   do	   not	   seem	   to	   be	  constitutive	  of	  two	  different	  causal	  chains	  that	  preserve	  objective	  information	  about	  a	  situation.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  they	  fully	  seem	  to	  depend	  on	  the	  practical	  interests	  of	  the	  gambler’s	  wife	  and	  his	  friends.	  The	  wife’s	  concern	  for	  not	  having	  money	  might	  explain	   her	   hesitance	   to	   attribute	   the	   epistemic	   ability	   underlying	   the	   alleged	  ‘knowledge	   that	   a	   horse	   will	   win’	   to	   her	   husband,	   while	   the	   other	   gambler’s	  interests	   in	   finding	   tips	   for	   wining	   bets	   explain	   their	   eagerness	   to	   attribute	   such	  knowledge.	  But	   this	   sounds	   just	   like	  hesitance	  and	  eagerness.	  More	  precisely,	   it	   is	  hard	  to	  see	  any	  causal	  chain	  being	  established	  by	  these	  practical	  interests	  that	  could	  preserve	   two	   different	   ways	   in	   which	   objective	   information	   is	   preserved.	   In	   the	  previous	   case,	   there	   are	   two	   alternative	   causal	   chains	   that	   preserve	   objective	  information.	  With	   the	  gambler’s	   case	   there	   is	  hardly	  one	   (the	  alleged	  causal	   chain	  seems	   to	   be	   a	   feature	   of	   how	   different	   subjects	   interpret	   the	   situation).	   So	   this	  seems	   to	  be	  a	   folksy	  understanding	  of	  causality	   that	   is	  not	   really	   fact	   involving,	  at	  least	   not	   in	   the	   robust	   counterfactually	   supportive	   way	   that	   causality	   generally	  requires,	  e.g.,	  the	  horse	  could	  have	  won	  just	  by	  pure	  luck	  and	  the	  gambler	  just	  had	  a	  lot	  of	  consecutive	  lucky	  guess—a	  very	  nearby	  possibility	  in	  the	  context	  of	  gambling,	  which	  is	  problematic	  for	  Greco’s	  notion	  of	  ‘practical	  environment.’	  But	   even	   assuming	   that	   these	   examples	   are	   unproblematic,	   the	   abilities	   of	  
agents	  need	  not	  be	  captured	  by	  a	   folk	  or	  metaphysical	  understanding	  of	   causality.	  One	  needs	   to	  know	  more	  about	   the	  psychology	  of	  agents	  and	   their	  motivations	   in	  
order	   to	   determine	   whether	   they	   are	   satisfying	   the	   constraints	   imposed	   by	   a	  (reliabilist)	   virtue	   epistemology.	  What	   type	   of	   agency	   will	   be	   required	   to	   explain	  epistemic	   success?	   The	   psychological	   evidence	   has	   shown	   that	   introspective	   and	  conscious	   reflective	   constraints	   on	   epistemic	   processes	   are	   counterproductive12.	  People	   are	   very	   bad	   at	   determining	   their	   own	   reasons	   for	   action	   and	   decision	  making,	  and	  they	  violate	  very	  simple	  rules	  of	  logic	  and	  probability	  when	  presented	  with	   irrelevant	   information	   which	   is,	   incidentally,	   potentially	   constitutive	   of	   a	  practical	   environment,	   like	   in	   Kahneman	   and	   Tversky’s	   famous	   “Linda”	   case.13	  So	  why	  would	  one	  hope	  that	  agents	  are	  any	  good	  at	  determining	  the	  basis	  for	  actions	  of	  other	  people?	  It	  seems	  that	  the	  best	  thing	  to	  do	  is	  to	  focus	  on	  paradigmatic	  reliabilist	  cases	   of	   cognitive	   dispositions:	   perceptual	   beliefs,	   memory,	   communication	   and	  testimony,	   language	   acquisition,	   motor	   control,	   basic	   forms	   of	   inductive	   and	  deductive	   inference	   and	   even	   the	   proper	   use	   of	   heuristics.	   All	   of	   these	   involve	  abilities	   and	   an	   associated	   range	   of	   epistemic	   successes,	   but	   they	   also	   allow	   for	   a	  	  much	   more	   minimal	   sense	   of	   agency	   and	   thus	   avoid	   worries	   about	   the	   truth	  conduciveness	  of	   reflective	  and	  epistemically	  costly	   forms	  of	   reasoning	   that	  might	  be	  required	  for	  knowledge	  by	  a	  (reflectively)	  more	  demanding	  virtue	  epistemology.	  	  	  Even	   in	   the	   case	   of	   perceptual	   belief	   one	   must	   be	   careful.	   Any	   epistemic	  account	   of	   the	   causal	   salience	   of	   the	   abilities	   of	   agents	   must	   be	   informed	   and	  constrained	  by	   the	  relevant	  psychological	  evidence.	  Greco	  specifies	   two	   important	  psychological	   constraints	   on	   epistemic	   agency.	   He	   says	   that	   it	   need	   not	   involve	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  See	  Kornblith	  2013	  for	  a	  full	  exploration	  of	  the	  limits	  of	  reflection	  in	  achieving	  knowledge.	  	  13	  For	  a	  defense	  of	  virtue	  epistemology	  against	  the	  situationist	  challenge,	  partly	  based	  on	  this	  evidence,	  see	  our	  (2014)	  paper.	  
conscious	  awareness,	  and	  also	  that	  it	  must	  allow	  for	  cognitive	  integration	  with	  other	  reliable	  epistemic	  processes,	  in	  a	  way	  that	  guarantees	  sensitivity	  to	  those	  processes.	  We	  will	  take	  these	  important	  constraints	  for	  granted.	  Epistemologists	  have	  assumed	  that	   there	   is	   only	   one	   type	   of	   agency	   involved	   in	   basic	   perceptual	   belief	   forming	  processes	   and	   reliabilists,	   in	   particular,	   have	   assumed	   that	   all	   perceptual	   belief	   is	  reliable	   and	   sensitive	   to	   accurate	   information	   from	   other	   perceptual	   cognitive	  processes	  (the	  qualification	  is	  important,	  because	  these	  processes	  are	  not	  in	  general	  influenced	  by	  inferential	  reasoning,	  i.e.,	  they	  seem	  to	  be	  encapsulated,	  although	  this	  is	  not	  entirely	  uncontroversial).	  	  However,	   not	   all	   the	   cognitive	   integration	   for	   perception	   is	   epistemically	  sensitive.	   Perceptual	   illusions	   illustrate	   this	   point.	   One	   consciously	   sees	   the	  difference	  in	  length	  of	  two	  lines	  in	  the	  Müller-­‐Lyer	  illusion,	  even	  though	  one	  knows	  (and	   therefore	   truly	  believes)	   that	   they	   are	   the	   same	   length.	  Our	   conscious	   visual	  perception	  is	  in	  this	  particular	  case,	  impervious	  to	  reliable	  epistemic	  influence.	  But	  surprisingly,	  motor	   control	   is	   epistemically	   sensitive	   to	   such	   information,	  even	   in	  cases	   of	   perceptual	   illusion.	   This	   is	   not	   because	   conscious	   belief	   influences	  motor	  control.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  motor	  control	   is	  not	   influenced	  at	  all	  by	  conscious	  belief.	  What	  is	  striking	  about	  this	  finding	  is	  that	  the	  perceptual	  system	  has	  a	  divided	  agent	  in	  this	  case.	  One	  perceptual	  “half”	  of	  the	  agent	  is	  influenced	  by	  the	  illusion	  and	  the	  other	  one	  is	  sensitive	  (in	  the	  epistemically	  relevant	  sense	  of	  the	  word).14	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  This	   way	   of	   talking	   about	   divided	   agency	   is	   not	   new,	   and	   actually	   has	   become	  quite	  standard	  in	  cognitive	  psychology.	  See	  for	  instance,	  Kahneman,	  D.	  (2011),	  who	  distinguishes	   between	   Systems	   1	   and	   2	   (according	   to	   Kahneman,	   two	   different	  forms	  of	  epistemic	  agency,	  one	  reliable	  and	  the	  other	  unreliable	  and	  susceptible	  of	  being	  influenced	  by	  irrelevant	  information).	  
For	   instance,	   in	   the	   Müller-­‐Lyer	   illusion,	   although	   the	   subjects’	   conscious	  self-­‐report	   is	   inaccurate	   and	   reflects	   the	   illusion’s	   cognitive	   influence,	   their	  motor	  control	   (specifically	   their	   unconscious	   manual	   behavior	   for	   grasping)	   is	   accurate	  and	  not	  influenced	  by	  the	   illusion.	  This	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  conscious	  perception	  has	   little	   influence	  on	  action.	  However,	   Stottinger	  and	  Perner	   (2006)	   showed	   that	  although	  motor	   control	   is	   not	   influenced	   by	   the	   illusion,	   cognitive	   processes	   that	  involve	  agency	   for	  action	  selection,	   just	   as	   conscious	  perception,	   are	   influenced	  by	  the	  illusion.	  	  	   In	   their	   experiment,	   Stottinger	   and	  Perner	  presented	   subjects	  with	   vertical	  lines	   grouped	   in	   two	   sets	   (one	   with	   open	   brackets	   and	   the	   other	   with	   closed	  brackets,	  as	  in	  the	  standard	  Müller-­‐Lyer	  illusion).	  When	  asked	  ‘which	  gang	  of	  lines	  would	  you	  fight?’	  subjects	  chose	  the	  “smaller”	  lines	  although	  their	  motor	  control	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  this	  question	  did	  not	  distinguish	  between	  the	  sets	  of	  lines,	  because	  it	  was	   not	   influenced	   by	   the	   illusion.	   This	   finding	   demonstrates	   the	   dissociation	  between	  action	  selection	  and	  motor	  control.	  Morsella	  and	  Bargh	  (2010,	  7)	  say	  that	  this	   dissociation	   occurs	   because	   inborn	   or	   learned	   information	   from	   the	   ventral	  stream	   (which	   is	   associated	  with	   conscious	   urges)	   constrains	   action	   selection	   but	  not	  motor	  control.15	  Conscious	   inclinations	   or	   urges	   about	   fighting	   are	   clearly	   irrelevant	   for	  reliable	   perception.	   But	   they	   are	   certainly	   constitutive	   of	   practical	   interests	   that	  create	  what	  Greco	  calls	  ‘practical	  environments.’	  This	  finding	  strongly	  suggests	  that	  one	   should	   not	   focus	   on	   the	   practical	   environments	   that	  make	   a	   causal	   narrative	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  See	  also	  Goodale,	  M.	  A.	  (2010).	  
(folksy	   or	   metaphysical)	   salient.	   In	   this	   case	   the	   salient	   ability	   of	   the	   agent	   is	  unreliable,	   given	   the	   fighting	   practical	   environment,	   while	   in	   the	   practical	  environment	   of	   grasping	   the	   object,	   the	   ability	   of	   the	   agent	   is	   reliable.	   Thus,	   one	  needs	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  agent’s	  psychology	  to	  constrain	  causal	  chains	  based	  on	  stable	  epistemic	  dispositions,	  regardless	  of	  how	  practical	  environments	  are	  construed.	   In	  other	  words,	  the	  order	  of	  explanation	  should	  start	  with	  the	  agent’s	  psychology,	  not	  with	  the	  practical	  environments	  for	  causal	  salience	  and	  practical	  interests.	  For	  this	  reason,	   folksy	   narratives	   seem	   irrelevant	   for	   epistemic	   responsibility,	   while	  metaphysical	  ones	  seem	  too	  broad	  to	  really	  explain	  it.	  	  The	   information	   for	   action	   selection	   based	   on	   conscious	   inclinations	   may	  lead	   to	  good	  practical	  decisions,	  but	  not	   to	   reliably	  produced	   true	  belief.	  Accurate	  motor	  control	  concerning	  unconscious	  information	  about	  length,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  a	  precondition	  for	  successful	  navigation.	  So	  it	  makes	  sense	  that	  the	  epistemically	  relevant	  information	  that	  allows	  agents	  to	  succeed,	  based	  on	  their	  knowledge	  of	  the	  environment,	   ignores,	   or	   is	   insensitive	   to,	   the	   epistemically	   irrelevant	   conscious	  information	   concerning	   who	   to	   fight,	   and	   related	   practical	   interests	   based	   on	  conscious	  urges.	  	  	   Epistemic	  success	  (achieving	  true	  belief)	   from	  epistemic	  virtue	  seems	  to	  be	  guaranteed	   only	   at	   the	   motor	   control	   level	   in	   this	   particular	   example,	   but	   the	  dissociation	  between	  motor	  control	  and	  action	  selection	  extends	  to	  many	  forms	  of	  agency.	   Crucially,	   cognitive	   integration	   for	   motor	   control	   processes	   that	   lead	   to	  success	  in	  a	  reliable	  fashion	  is	  insensitive	  to	  epistemically	  irrelevant	  inclinations,	  or	  highly	   sophisticated	   theoretical	   or	   philosophical	   beliefs,	   in	   spite	   of	   the	   fact	   that	  
those	   inclinations	   may	   underlie	   practical	   interests.	   However,	   as	   the	   example	   just	  mentioned	  shows,	  cognitive	  integration	  for	  conscious	  processes	  and	  action	  selection	  is,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  case	  of	  illusion,	  sensitive	  to	  epistemically	  irrelevant	  information.	  So	  motor	   control	   knowledge	   complies	   with	   the	   right	   kind	   of	   cognitive	   integration	  required	  for	  very	  stable	  epistemic	  virtues.	  Epistemic	  virtues	  are	  generally	  described	  as	  stable	  dispositions	  attributable	  to	  an	  agent.	  The	  more	  stable	  the	  disposition,	  the	  more	  successful	  the	  agent.	  The	  less	  sensitive	  epistemic	  virtues	  are	  to	  practical	  or	  highly	  theoretical	  considerations,	  the	  more	   stable	   they	  will	   be,	   and	  vice	   versa.	  Epistemologists	  need	   to	  be	   selective	   and	  careful	  when	  they	  talk	  about	  epistemic	  agency.	  A	  rich	  sense	  of	  agency	  that	  includes	  all	  sorts	  of	  conscious	  and	  unconscious	  inclinations	  is	  problematic	  (some	  abilities	  of	  the	  same	  agent	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  unreliable	  in	  some	  situations,	  while	  others	  tend	  to	  be	  highly	  reliable,	  even	  though	  the	  perceptual	  stimulus	  is	  the	  same).	  Moreover,	  motor	  control	  knowledge	  of	  the	  type	  that	   is	   involved	  in	  grasping	  objects	   is	   firmly	   associated	  with	   facts	   about	   the	   environment,	   and	   the	   success	   of	  agents	  is	  contingent	  upon	  these	  facts.	  True	  beliefs	  about	  environmental	  features	  are	  formed	   reliably	   because	   of	   these	   virtues,	   thereby	   allowing	   agents	   to	   avoid	   errors	  and	   lucky	   guesses	   across	   a	   large	   variety	   of	   situations.	   So	   there	   is	   counterfactual	  dependency	  between	   the	  success	  of	  agents	  and	   these	  stable	  epistemic	  virtues	   that	  reliably	  form	  true	  beliefs	  about	  facts.	  This	  is	  the	  type	  of	  counterfactual	  dependency	  that	  is	  indispensible	  for	  a	  causal	  account	  of	  epistemic	  virtue	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  ‘because	  of’	   relation:	   metaphysically	   plausible	   and	   psychologically	   informed.	   But	   this	   does	  not	  mean	   that	   practical	   reasons,	   conscious	   action	   selection	   and	   introspection	   are	  
epistemically	  irrelevant	  in	  general.	  As	  Greco	  says,	  there	  may	  be	  epistemic	  virtues	  of	  many	   different	   kinds	   (not	   necessarily	   associated	   with	   knowledge,	   but	   with	   other	  epistemic	   goals).	   Obviously,	   conscious	   perception	   is	   also	   highly	   reliable	   if	   not	  disturbed	  by	  illusions.	  But	  the	  point	  is	  that	  the	  same	  epistemic	  agent	  may	  manifest	  radically	   different	   abilities	   at	   any	   point,	   concerning	   the	   same	   stimulus,	   and	  therefore,	   the	   notion	   of	   agency	   must	   be	   psychologically	   construed	   in	   order	   to	  provide	  a	  naturalized	  virtue	  epistemology.	  	  
IV.	  Success	  semantics:	  the	  constraints	  on	  causality	  and	  cognitive	  processing	  	  An	   important	  difficulty	  with	  respect	   to	  Greco’s	  characterization	  of	   the	   ‘because	  of’	  relation	   is	   that	   causal	   salience	   based	   on	   practical	   interests	   does	   not	   necessarily	  preserve	   objective	   information	   constitutive	   of	   causal	   chains.	   More	   specifically,	  knowledge	   attribution	   becomes	   problematically	   dependent	   on	   practical	  considerations	   concerning	   causal	   salience	   that	   assume	   a	   uniform	   type	   of	   agency,	  which	   does	   not	   comport	   adequately	   with	   the	   experimental	   evidence	   on	   action	  selection	   and	   motor	   control.	   This	   is	   a	   significant	   problem	   for	   the	   prospect	   of	   a	  reliabilist-­‐naturalized	  virtue	  epistemology.	  The	   counterfactual	   supporting	   generalizations	   that	   are	   characteristic	   of	  causal	   relations	   seem	   to	   demand	   a	   more	   direct	   correlation	   between	   the	   agent’s	  success	   and	   the	   causal	   conditions	   required	   for	   their	   success,	   which	   should	   be	  confirmed	  experimentally.	   Practical	   interests	  may	  be	   relevant	   for	   some	  aspects	   of	  knowledge	   attribution	   (particularly	   with	   respect	   to	   how	   the	   term	   ‘knowledge’	   is	  
used	  by	  the	  folk),	  but	  they	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  help	  explain	  naturalized	  epistemic	  virtues.	  Moreover,	   this	  causal	  requirement	   is	  hard	  to	  square	  with	  a	  semantics	   that	  centers	  on	  the	  motivations	  and	  goals	  of	  agents.	  	  It	   seems	   that	   a	   plausible	   way	   to	   address	   these	   problems	   is	   by	   offering	   a	  different	   semantics	   for	   knowledge	   attribution	   with	   quite	   unique	   features	   (e.g.,	  causal	  relevance	  compatible	  with	  naturalistic	  constraints,	  motivational	  components	  and	  abilities	  of	  agents).	  We	  shall	  argue	  that	  the	  best	  candidate	  to	  fulfill	   this	  role	   is	  the	   so-­‐called	   ‘success	   semantics,’	   proposed	   originally	   by	   Ramsey	   (1927).	   Ramsey	  said	   that	   knowledge	   is	   true	   belief	   that	   is	   achieved	   by	   a	   reliable	   process	   (1931).	  Independently	  of	  this	  thesis,	  he	  also	  proposed	  that	  the	  truth	  condition	  of	  a	  belief	  is	  the	   condition	   that	   guarantees	   the	   success	   of	   desires	   based	   on	   that	   belief.16	  (1927,	  144)	   These	   theses	   entail	   a	   version	   of	   reliabilism	   that	   has	   significant	   advantages	  because	  it	  incorporates	  motivational-­‐cognitive	  factors	  into	  our	  account	  of	  epistemic	  abilities.	  The	  question	  is	  how	  Ramey’s	  original	  account	  of	  content	  can	  be	  tailored	  to	  accommodate	   the	   specific	   requirements	   of	   reliabilist-­‐naturalized	   virtue	  epistemology.	  True	   beliefs,	   according	   to	   Ramsey’s	   proposal,	   can	   be	   defined	   as	   functions	  from	  desires	  (or	  goals)	  to	  actions	  that	  cause	  agents	  to	  behave	  in	  ways	  that	  succeed	  in	   satisfying	   their	   desires	   or	   goals.17	  This	   characterization	   defines	   belief-­‐forming	  processes	  as	  functional	  operations	  or	  procedures	  that	  determine	  a	  mapping	  from	  an	  input	  (i.e.,	  a	  desire	  or	  goal)	  to	  an	  output	  (a	  concrete	  action	  or	  the	  fulfillment	  of	  the	  goal),	  and	  it	  has	  the	  advantage	  that	  it	  does	  not	  focus	  exclusively	  on	  beliefs	  and	  their	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  This	  formulation	  of	  Ramsey’s	  proposal	  is	  due	  to	  Whyte,	  J.	  (1990).	  17	  See	  Bermudez,	  J.	  L.	  (2003,	  66).	  
contents	   (propositional	   attitudes	   and	   possible	   worlds).	   As	   required	   by	   virtue	  epistemology,	   success	   semantics	   focuses	   on	   the	   agent	   and	   her	   epistemic	  motivations,	  and	  starts	  the	  causal	  order	  of	  explanation	  with	  the	  epistemic	  abilities	  of	  agents.	  	  Moreover,	   this	   account	   mirrors	   the	   structure	   of	   dispositions,	   which	   have	  antecedent	   conditions	   that	   must	   be	   satisfied	   for	   the	   manifestation	   condition	   to	  occur,	  and	  according	  to	  a	  standard	  characterization	  of	  virtues,	  epistemic	  virtues	  are	  stable	  dispositions	  that	  manifest	  in	  true	  belief.	  This	  means	  that	  epistemic	  virtues,	  so	  characterized,	  may	   comply	  with	   a	   safety	  condition	   according	   to	  which,	   if	   an	   agent	  knows	   that	   something	   is	   the	   case,	   then	   her	   desires	   could	   not	   easily	   have	   gone	  unsatisfied.	   	  This	   is	  explained	  by	  the	   fact	   that	   the	   true	  belief	  could	  not	  have	  easily	  been	  false	  given	  that	  it	  was	  reliably	  produced.	   	  This	  success	  will	  also	  be	  due	  to	  the	  agent	  because	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  desire	  will	  be	  due	  to	  some	  action	  of	  the	  agent.	  It	  is	  important	   to	   emphasize	   that,	   as	   a	   general	   theory	   of	   content	   and	   truth,	   success	  semantics	  is	  explicitly	  a	  causal	  theory,	  because,	  as	  Peter	  Smith	  (2003)	  says:	  	  	   For	   certain	   beliefs,	   the	   content	   of	   the	   belief	   is	   that	   p	   just	   if,	   for	   any	   appropriate	   desire,	  actions	   caused	   by	   that	   belief	   combined	   with	   a	   desire	   will	   be	   successful	   in	   realizing	   the	  desire’s	  object	  just	  in	  case	  that	  p.	  And	  of	  course,	  there	  is	  no	  magic	  about	  the	  relation	  between	  its	   being	   the	   case	   that	   p	   and	   successful	   action:	   it	   will	   be	   a	   causal	   condition	   for	   success.	  (Smith,	  2003,	  49)	  	  As	  mentioned,	  truth	  can	  be	  defined	  similarly,	  by	  stating	  that	  a	  true	  belief	  is	  one	  that	  
causes	  successful	  actions,	  if	  combined	  with	  appropriate	  desires.18	  A	  very	  important	  feature	   of	   this	   definition	   is	   that	   it	   appeals	   to	   the	   causal	   powers	   of	   beliefs	   in	  conjunction	  with	  motivational	   states	   of	   agents,	   thereby	   allowing	   for	   a	   naturalistic	  account	  of	  epistemic	  motivation.	  The	  condition	  that	  must	  obtain	  for	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  desires	  is	  one	  that	  must	  be	  satisfied	  reliably.	  Success	  is,	  obviously,	  not	  guaranteed	  across	   all	   possible	   worlds.	   Rather,	   the	   causal	   powers	   of	   beliefs	   manifest	   only	   in	  conjunction	   with	   desires	   at	   a	   specific	   set	   of	   worlds,	   determining	   a	   contingent	  relation	  among	  them.	  	  This	  also	  maps	  neatly	  with	  the	  metaphysical	  characteristics	  of	  dispositions,	  their	  causal	   bases	   and	   their	   manifestation	   conditions.	   Coupled	   with	   reliability,	   this	  account	   says	   that:	   a	   belief	   is	   true	   if	   and	   only	   if,	   in	   conjunction	   with	   the	   right	  
motivation,	   actual	   and	   possible	   actions	   caused	   by	   the	   belief	   are	   typically	   (reliably)	  
successful.19 	  The	   condition	   that	   must	   obtain	   for	   the	   satisfaction	   of	   desires	   or	  motivations	  is	  called	  the	  ‘utility	  condition.’	  Mellor	  (1991)	  describes	  it	  as	  follows:	  	   [We]	   can’t	   equate	   a	   belief’s	   truth	   conditions	   with	   those	   in	   which	   every	   action	   it	   helps	   to	  cause	   succeeds.	   But	  we	   can	   if	  we	   restrict	   the	   actions	   to	   those	   caused	   just	   by	   it	   and	   some	  desire.	  Then	  its	  truth	  conditions	  are	  what	  I	  shall	  call	  its	  ‘utility	  conditions’:	  those	  in	  which	  all	  such	  actions	  would	  achieve	  the	  desired	  end.	  (Mellor,	  1991,	  23)	  	  This	   restriction	   is	   crucial	   because	   it	   shows	   that	   motivational	   components	   are	  
fundamental	  to	  constrain	  the	  range	  of	  causally	  relevant	  doxastic	  attitudes,	  as	  well	  as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  See	  Mellor,	  D.	  H.	  (1991).	  19	  See	  Blackburn,	  S.	  (2011)	  for	  more	  advantages	  of	  success	  semantics	  as	  a	  theory	  of	  content.	  
the	   type	   of	   cognitive	   process	   that	   leads	   to	   success.	   These	   kinds	   of	   issues	   are	   also	  very	  relevant	  to	  the	  core	  project	  of	  virtue	  epistemology	  discussed	  in	  section	  I	  above,	  which	   centers	   on	   individuating	   disposition	   types	   and	   clarifying	   the	   causal-­‐explanatory	  role	  of	  abilities	  in	  successful	  outcomes.	  	  But	  despite	  its	  advantages,	  Ramsey’s	  success	  semantics	  needs	  to	  be	  modified,	  so	   that	  one	  obtains	  not	  a	  semantics	   for	   true	  belief,	  but	   for	  knowledge	  attributions	  and	   our	   account	   of	   what	   it	   is	   for	   a	   true	   belief	   to	   be	   sufficiently	   because	   of	   the	  epistemic	   virtue	   of	   the	   believer.	   In	   other	  words,	   the	   beliefs	   in	   question	   of	   course	  must	   be	   true,	   what	   needs	   semantic	   evaluation	   is	   whether	   or	   not	   true	   beliefs	   are	  produced	  by	  virtuous	  epistemic	  dispositions.	  We	  claim	  that	  a	  success	  semantics	  for	  epistemology	  can	  provide	  valuable	  advances	  in	  understanding	  the	  etiological	  nature	  of	  knowledge	  by	  unifying	  the	  following	  	  desiderata	  in	  a	  straightforward	  action-­‐first	  normative-­‐factive	  principle	  that	  locates	  the	  agent	  right	  at	  the	  center	  of	  evaluation.	  	  (1)	   Provide	   the	   right	   kind	   of	   causes	   -­‐	   reliable	   psychological	   dispositions	   of	  agents,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  motor	  control	  abilities.	  	  (2)	   these	   dispositions	  must	   also	   be	   attributable	   to	   the	   agent	   in	   a	  way	   that	  generates	  credit	  for	  any	  epistemic	  success	  that	  might	  be	  achieved	  because	  of	  the	  causal	  connection	  in	  (1)	  (3)	  explain	  cognitive	  integration	  and	  the	  epistemic	  standings	  it	  gives	  rise	  to	  (4)	   motivational	   states	   are	   also	   included	   in	   the	   dispositions	   that	   manifest	  knowledge	  and	  sufficiently	  involve	  the	  agent.	  	  	  This	   is	   a	   plausible	   extension	  of	   success	   semantics	   because	  knowledge	   is	   a	   type	  of	  
epistemic	   success.	   The	   payoff	   is	   that	   all	   the	   naturalistic	   advantages	   of	   success	  semantics	  can	  be	  used	  to	  give	  a	  virtue	  theoretical	  account	  of	  knowledge.	  	  While	  the	  role	  of	  desires	   in	  central	  here,	  but	  a	  ramsey-­‐success	   is	  also	  constrained	  by	  facts	   in	  the	  world	  outside	  the	  agent.	   	  Think	  of	   the	  sense	   in	  which	  a	  Ramsey-­‐success	   is	   fact	  involving	   this	   way:	   If	   you	   perform	   a	   complex	   task,	   like	   playing	   piano,	   it	   seems	  obvious	  that	  the	  set	  of	  beliefs	  that	  would	  be	  required	  to	  succeed	  in	  hitting	  the	  keys	  is	  larger	  and	  more	  varied	  that	  those	  you	  would	  choose	  based	  on	  how	  you	  want	  to	  hit	  the	  keys	  	   A	   modification	   of	   Ramsey’s	   success	   semantics	   yields	   the	   following	  straightforward	  account	  of	  epistemic	  achievements,	  which	  will	  need	  further	  refining	  below:	  a	  virtuous	  cognitive	  disposition	  is	  one	  that	  causes	  an	  agent	  to	  reliably	  satisfy	  his	  or	  her	  epistemic	  desires.	  More	  specifically,	  the	  truth	  condition	  for	  the	  attribution	  of	   an	   epistemic	   achievement	   is	   the	   condition	   that	   guarantees	   the	   success	   of	  epistemic	  goals,	  and	  the	  action	   is	  also	  caused	  by	  abilities	  attributable	  to	  the	  agent.	  Knowledge	  attributions	  are	  adequate	  when	  they	  are	  based	  on	  the	  motivational	  and	  doxastic	   components	   of	   abilities	   that	   produce	   true	   belief.	   In	   the	   specific	   case	   of	  knowledge,	  the	  only	  relevant	  desire	  may	  be	  the	  desire	  to	  believe	  the	  truth	  and	  avoid	  falsehood	  (See	  Greco,	  2010).	  Other	  desires	  may	  aim	  for	  the	  means	  to	  truth	  (say	  the	  desire	   to	   have	   justified	   beliefs),	   or	   for	   different	   epistemic	   achievements	   such	   as	  understanding	  and	  intellectual	  creativity.	  	  This	  establishes	  a	  naturalistic	  semantic	  constraint	  on	  knowledge	  attribution	  specifically,	   and	   not	   a	   constraint	   on	   propositional	   content	   in	   general,	   as	   Ramsey	  
originally	  proposed.	  The	  variables	  salient	  for	  explaining	  success	  involve:(a)	  desires	  in	   the	   agent	   (b)	   causal	   relations	   independent	   of	   these	   desires(c)	   successful	  outcomes	  caused	  by	  (a)	  and	  (b).	  But	  this	  needs	  unpacking,	  because	  of	   the	  findings	  concerning	  motor	  control	  and	  action	  selection.	  A	  Ramsey-­‐success	  cannot	  plausibly	  require	   the	   satisfaction	   of	   a	   fully	   conscious	   epistemic	   desire	   to	   believe	   the	   truth.	  Rather,	  we	  propose	  that	  it	  is	  a	  motivational	  inclination	  (which	  may	  be	  unconscious)	  that	   must	   cause	   the	   action	   that	   constitutes	   or	   causes	   success.	   Manual	   behavior	  manifests	   the	   true	   belief	   (or	   at	   least	   an	   epistemic	   entitlement)	   that	   the	   lines	   are	  equal,	  while	  the	  response	  for	  action	  selection	  does	  not.	  The	  motivational	  inclination	  in	  manual	   behavior	   is	   to	   succeed	   in	   accurately	   selecting	   lines	   because	   of	   the	   fact-­‐based	  aspects	  of	  those	  lines.	  The	  abilities	  that	  underlie	  successful	  manual	  behavior	  are	  stable,	  even	   in	   the	  presence	  of	   illusory	  stimuli	   that	   trick	  conscious	  perception.	  Causality	   is	  specified	  by	  the	  facts,	   the	  abilities	  of	  the	  agent	  and	  the	  agent’s	  success	  rate,	  and	  not	  by	  narratives	  involving	  practical	  interests.	  This	   may	   be	   the	   best	   way	   to	   achieve	   a	   naturalistic	   version	   of	   epistemic	  responsibility.	  As	  mentioned,	  Greco	  chooses	  explanatory	  salience	  contextualism	  for	  the	  semantic	  evaluation	  of	  knowledge	  attributions,	  but	  this	  semantic	  approach	  does	  not	  really	  appeal	  to	  the	  motivations	  of	  the	  agent,	  and	  rather	  focuses	  exclusively	  on	  the	   causally	   salient	   factors	   of	   a	   situation,	   as	   specified	   by	   the	   interests	   of	   the	  attributor.	  An	  advantage	  of	   the	  present	   account	   is	   that	   it	   focuses	  on	  both	   causally	  relevant	  factors	  and	  motivational	  components	  of	  cognitive	  dispositions.	  	  
	  
V.	  Objections	  
	  The	   situationist	   objection	   to	   this	   proposal	   is	   as	   follows.	   Virtue	   epistemology	   does	  not	   need	   this	   kind	   of	   help.	   These	   divided	   agent	   findings	   actually	   have	   a	   skeptical	  consequence,	   namely,	   that	   in	   many	   circumstances,	   abilities	   are	   unstable	   and	  produce	   false	   belief.	   In	   particular,	   the	   findings	   on	   human	   rationality	   suggest	   that	  there	   are	   two	   systems,	   1	   and	   2.	   System	   1	   is	   highly	   dependent	   on	   context,	   and	  systematically	  trumps	  the	  careful,	  though	  slow,	  epistemic	  processing	  of	  system	  2.	  A	  divided	   epistemic	   agent	   is	   the	   source	   of	   worries	   about	   the	   stability	   of	   epistemic	  dispositions,	  and	  this	  is	  evidence	  against	  a	  reliabilist	  version	  of	  epistemic	  virtue.	  A	  response	  to	  this	  objection	  is	  that	  the	  findings	  on	  systems	  1	  and	  2,	  as	  well	  as	  the	   findings	   on	   motor	   control	   and	   action	   selection,	   are	   compatible	   with	   a	  naturalized	   virtue	   epistemology	   based	   on	   very	   robust	   abilities,	   confirmed	   by	  experimental	   evidence. 20 	  Motor	   control	   abilities	   are	   remarkably	   sensitive	   and	  robust.	   Other	   forms	   of	   robust	   abilities	  may	   be	   found	   for	   quick	   inferences,	   across	  different	   situations,	   if	   one	   assumes	   that	   success	   rate	   is	   crucial	   for	   knowledge	  attribution.	  Notice	  that	  the	  difference	  between	  systems	  1	  and	  2	   is	  unhelpful	   in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  illusion	  of	  length.	  One	  is	  squarely	  within	  system	  1.	  But	  this	  does	  not	  open	  up	  a	  situationist	  challenge	   for	  perceptual	  belief.	  Rather,	   it	   calls	   for	  a	  psychological	  constraint	   on	   the	   semantics	   for	   knowledge	   attribution	   that	   highlights	   the	  importance	  of	  motivations,	  like	  success	  semantics.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  See	  “Situationism,	  Naturalism	  and	  Epistemic	  Virtue”	  (Fairweather	  and	  Montemayor	  2104)	  for	  a	  detailed	  defense.	  
	  	   Another	   objection	   is	   that	   skepticism	   about	   folksy	   knowledge	   attributions	  (which	  seem	  to	  be	  the	  relevant	  ones	  that	  need	  explaining)	  seems	  to	  be	  entailed	  by	  this	   proposal.	   If	   one	   cannot	   account	   for	   the	   person	   in	   the	   street,	   attributing	  knowledge	   to	   her	   peers,	   then	   the	   threat	   of	   skepticism	   with	   respect	   to	   normal	  knowledge	  attribution	  is	  significant,	  because	  it	  seems	  that	  only	  experts	  will	  be	  able	  to	  adequately	  attribute	  knowledge	  to	  subjects.	  	  The	  case	  of	   the	   lines	   is	   just	  an	   illustration	  of	  how	  epistemic	  agency	   is	  not	  a	  uniform	   and	   monolithic	   phenomenon.	   Rather,	   it	   comes	   in	   many	   varieties	   and	  involves	  many	  different	  abilities.	  But,	  in	  general,	  success	  is	  a	  good	  guide	  to	  accurate	  knowledge	   attribution,	   and	   so	   no	   skepticism	   about	   folksy	   knowledge	   attributions	  follows	  from	  our	  proposal.	  However,	  for	  a	  fully	  naturalized	  virtue	  epistemology,	  the	  most	  stable	  virtues	  must	  be	  identified,	  and	  motor	  control	  abilities	  seem	  to	  be	  more	  stable	  than	  action	  selection	  ones.	  In	  other	  words,	  motor	  control	  abilities,	  because	  of	  their	  importance	  in	  successful	  navigation,	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  model	  for	  robust	  epistemic	  virtue.	   Agents	   have	   a	   psychology	   with	   a	   rich	   variety	   of	   these	   epistemic	   virtues,	  which	   underlie	   folk	   attributions	   based	   on	   the	   success	   of	   agents.	   Because	   of	   the	  success	   rate	   produced	   by	   these	   abilities,	   these	   attributions	   can	   approximate	   the	  psychological	  constrained	  ones	  very	  closely.	  	  	  In	   order	   to	   avoid	   confusion,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   clarify	   that	   although	  psychological	   mechanisms	   and	   processing	   are	   not	   transparent	   (either	  introspectively	   or	   by	   judging	   the	   abilities	   of	   others),	   success	   is	   evident	   in	   the	  epistemic	  achievements	  of	  agents.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  manifestation	  of	  these	  virtues	  is	   plainly	   in	   view.	   If	   agents	   get	   things	   right	   in	   many	   cases,	   then	   this	   by	   itself	   is	  
evidence	  that	  they	  have	  robust	  epistemic	  dispositions	  to	  form	  true	  belief.	  Findings	  on	   how	   some	   epistemic	   stable	   dispositions	   get	   tricked	   under	   laboratory	  circumstances	   should	   not	   be	   interpreted	   skeptically,	   particularly	   in	   cases	   where	  information	  is	  ambiguously	  presented	  (e.g.,	  set	  inclusion	  and	  likelihood,	  understood	  abstractly	  or	  with	  a	  concrete	  example	  concerning	  practical	  considerations).	  	  Another	   objection	   is	   that	   unconscious	   motor	   control	   does	   not	   manifest	   in	  true	  belief,	  because	  beliefs	  have	  a	  compositional-­‐inferential	  structure	  that	  epistemic	  abilities	  based	  on	  unconscious	  inclinations	  lack.	  A	  response	  to	  this	  objection	  is	  that	  if	  virtues	  had	  to	  necessarily	  manifest	  in	  conscious	  true	  belief,	  then	  that	  would	  place	  a	   psychologically	   implausible	   restriction	   on	   virtue	   theories.	   Another	   related	  response	   is	   that,	   given	   the	   psychological	   evidence,	   a	   naturalized	   epistemology	  should	   liberate	   the	   notion	   of	  what	   counts	   as	   a	   doxastic	   attitude.	   These	   responses	  have	   been	   carefully	   defended	   in	   the	   literature,	   so	  we	   shall	   not	   elaborate	   on	   them	  here.	   An	  important	  source	  of	  the	  intuitive	  power	  behind	  the	  notion	  that	  agents	  are	  responsible	  only	  when	  they	  are	  in	  full	  conscious	  control	  of	  their	  actions	  comes	  from	  analogies	  with	  moral	   responsibility.	  How	  could	  one	  be	  morally	   responsible	   for	   an	  action	  if	  one	  is	  unconscious	  of	  producing	  such	  action?	  It	  is	  true	  that,	  in	  general,	  there	  seems	   to	  be	  a	  kind	  of	   a	  priori	  necessity	   to	  define	  moral	   responsibility	   in	   terms	  of	  fully	  conscious	  (perhaps	  even	  reflective-­‐introspective)	  awareness	  of	  the	  action	  and	  one’s	   own	   motivations	   to	   perform	   such	   action.	   But	   although	   analogies	   between	  moral	  and	  epistemic	  responsibility	  are	  sometimes	  useful,	  they	  are	  not	  useful	  in	  the	  specific	  case	  of	  ability	  attribution.	  Epistemic	  agents	  may	  succeed	  based	  on	  abilities	  
of	   which	   they	   lack	   conscious	   access	   (even	   though	   conscious	   access	   is	   compatible	  with	  such	  success).	  It	  is	  known	  that	  accessibilist	  versions	  of	  internalism	  may	  be	  too	  strong,	  even	  if	  one	  defends	  an	   internalist	  view	  of	   justification.21	  For	   reliabilist	   theories	   that	  are	  coupled	   with	   motivations	   in	   order	   to	   generate	   a	   naturalized	   virtue	   epistemology	  that	   emphasizes	   success,	   there	   is	   no	   reason	   to	   think	   that	   a	   strong	   reflective	   or	  conscious	   requirement	   is	   necessary	   for	   epistemic	   virtue.	   Greco	   certainly	   does	   not	  endorse	   such	   a	   requirement,	   and	   given	   the	   psychological	   evidence,	   it	   would	   be	  counterproductive	  to	  impose	  such	  constraints	  on	  naturalized	  epistemic	  virtues.	  With	  the	  type	  of	  virtues	  discussed	  in	  this	  paper,	  the	  epistemic	  agent	  is	  not	  in	  absolute,	  conscious	  reflective	  control	  of	  her	  epistemic	  achievements.	  But	  the	  agent	  is	  sufficiently	  in	  control	  to	  be	  the	  causal	  source	  of	  epistemic	  success,	  and	  this	  is	  all	  a	  virtue	   epistemology	   along	   reliabilist	   lines	   needs.	   With	   respect	   to	   the	   kind	   of	  motivations	   that	   epistemic	   virtues	   must	   have,	   likewise,	   these	   can	   be	   of	   a	   very	  minimal	   kind	   (unconscious	   and	   unreflective),	   such	   as	   inclinations	   to	   believe	   the	  truth	  about	  features	  of	  the	  environment	  in	  navigation.	  A	   related	   objection	   is	   that	   knowledge	   produced	   by	   motor	   control-­‐like	  abilities	   is	   dumb,	   or	   animal-­‐like.	   This	   account	   is,	   according	   to	   this	   objection,	   too	  minimal	   to	   explain	   the	   subtleties	   of	   traditional	   epistemological	   issues,	   such	   as	  skepticism,	  justified	  withheld	  judgment	  and	  meta-­‐virtues	  in	  general.	  It	  also	  seems	  to	  be	  too	  broad,	  besides	  being	  too	  minimal.	  All	  sorts	  of	  dumb	  creatures	  count	  as	  having	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  See	  Feldman	  and	  Conee	  (2001).	  
knowledge	   (basically	   all	   creatures	   that	   can	   navigate	   have	   knowledge	   of	   the	  environment).	  One	  response	  to	  this	  objection	  is	  that	  the	  account	  of	  virtue	  epistemology	  we	  are	   defending	   is	   naturalistic,	   and	   therefore,	   based	   on	   the	   empirical	   evidence.	   The	  empirical	   evidence	   has	   shown	   consistently	   and	   overwhelmingly	   that	   highly	  reflective	   conscious	  processing	   is	  by	  no	  means	   required	   for	   epistemic	   success.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  evidence	  has	  shown	  that	  highly	  reflective	  conscious	  processing	  gets	  on	  the	  way	  of	  epistemic	  successes.22	  This	  is	  enough	  to	  respond	  to	  this	  objection.	  With	   respect	   to	   the	   objection	   that	   this	   account	   is	   too	  broad,	   it	   is	   crucial	   to	  clarify	  that	  our	  account	  does	  not	  restrict	  epistemic	  virtues	  to	  navigation	  and	  animal-­‐like	  behavior	  (although	  we	  see	  nothing	  wrong	  in	  characterizing	  success	  from	  ability	  of	  the	  animal	  kind	  as	  knowledge).	  What	  we	  are	  proposing	  is	  that	  epistemic	  virtues	  must	  be	  very	   robust	  dispositions,	   and	   therefore,	  motor	   control-­‐like.	  Knowledge	  of	  syntax	  is	  a	  good	  illustration	  of	  what	  we	  have	  in	  mind.	  Knowledge	  of	  syntax	  seems	  to	  be	  uniquely	  human.	  It	  is	  the	  result	  of	  unconscious	  abilities	  and	  cognitive	  processes	  that	  are	  extremely	  robust.	  Children	  can	  learn	  any	  language	  in	  a	  highly	  unmonitored,	  unconscious	   and	   unreflective	   way.	   Thus,	   knowledge	   of	   syntax	   is	   an	   example	   of	   a	  highly	  sophisticated	  epistemic	  achievement	  that	  is	  motor	  control-­‐like.	  Finally,	  there	  are	  two	  objections	  that	  are	  based	  on	  the	  empirical	  evidence.23	  One	   objection	   is	   that	  motor	   control	   seems	   to	   be	   best	   understood	   as	   strictly	   sub-­‐personal,	   and	   therefore	   that	   these	   abilities	   seem	   to	   be	   a	   collection	   of	   fragmented	  capacities	   that	   have	   little	   in	   common.	   If	   so,	   these	   abilities	   seem	   inadequate	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  See	  Kornblith	  (2008).	  23	  We	  are	  grateful	  to	  Lauren	  Olin	  for	  bringing	  these	  objections	  to	  our	  attention.	  
account	   for	   knowledge	   that	   is	   attributable	   to	   the	   agent	   as	   such,	   because	   they	   are	  only	   attributable	   to	   fragmented	   capacities	   of	   the	   agent	   that	   may	   not	   be	   fully	  integrated	  with	  her	  motivations.	  A	  response	  to	  this	  objection	  is	  that	  all	  the	  examples	  of	  epistemic	  abilities	  that	  we	   have	   used	   (and	   the	   only	   ones	   our	   account	   would	   consider	   as	   candidates	   for	  producing	   knowledge)	   involve	   representational	   capacities	   at	   the	   organism	   level	  (e.g.,	   syntax	  processing,	  grasping	  an	  object	  based	  on	   the	  motor	   intention	   to	  do	  so,	  etc.).	  Moreover,	  as	  mentioned	  previously,	  we	  are	  assuming	  the	  criterion	  of	  cognitive	  integration,	  which	  Greco	  uses	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  odd	  or	  fleeting	  processes	  objection.	  Another	   objection	   is	   that	   some	   experiments	   (e.g.,	   Glover	   and	   Dixon,	   2002)	  seem	  to	  suggest	  that	  motor	  control	  cannot	  be	  decoupled	  from	  semantic	  information,	  in	   such	   a	   way	   that	   semantic	   information	   systematically	   affects	   the	   reliability	   of	  motor	  control,	  thus	  challenging	  the	  modal	  robustness	  and	  reliable	  character	  of	  these	  abilities.	   A	   response	   to	   this	   objection	   is	   that,	   indeed,	   there	   are	   multiple	   findings	  showing	  how	  semantic	  information	  decreases	  the	  accuracy	  of	  kinematic	  responses,	  such	  as	  grasping.	  However,	  the	  same	  body	  of	  research	  shows	  that	  this	  happens	  only	  
at	  the	  action	  selection	  and	  planning	  stage,	  which	   is	  conscious.	  Like	   the	  example	  we	  offered	  before,	  unconscious	  motor	  control	  is	  not	  hampered	  by	  this	  information.	  So,	  actually,	  all	  these	  findings	  support	  our	  approach.	  	  An	  alternative	   reply	   to	   this	  objection	   is	   that	   the	   fact	   that	   some	   information	  interferes	  with	  the	  speed	  and	  accuracy	  of	  a	  behavioral	  response	  does	  not	  entail	  that	  the	   abilities	   involved	   are	   unreliable.	   In	   the	   Stroop	   task,	   the	   interference	   between	  inclinations	   (the	  automatic	   inclination	   to	  read	  a	  word	  vs.	   identifying	  a	  color)	  does	  
not	  entail	  that	  the	  capacities	  involved	  are	  unreliable	  because	  of	  context	  sensitivity.	  The	   capacities	   to	   read	   and	   detect	   color	   are	   incredibly	   reliable	   across	   subjects,	   in	  many	   conditions.	   Interference	   only	   shows	   that	   having	   two	   inclinations	   affects	  processing.	  	  
Conclusion	  
	  The	   semantics	   for	   knowledge	   attribution	   that	   a	   naturalized	   virtue	   epistemology	  requires	  must	  include	  motivation.	  This	  is	  important	  not	  only	  because	  of	  theoretical	  considerations,	  but	  also	  because	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  indicates	  that	  this	  is	  needed.	  While	   a	   complete	   naturalized	   virtue	   epistemology,	   based	   on	   the	   main	   tenets	   of	  reliabilism,	  is	  still	  a	  work	  in	  progress,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  specify	  the	  constraints	  and	  contours	   of	   such	   a	   theory.	   We	   argued	   that	   Greco’s	   practical	   interests	   based	  semantics	  fails	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  theoretical	  requirements	  of	  virtue	  epistemology	  and	   the	   psychological	   evidence.	   An	   alternative	   semantics	   must	   satisfy	   these	  requirements.	  	  As	  Edward	  Craig	  (1990)	  says,	  subjects	  use	  knowledge	  attribution	  to	  flag	  good	  sources	  of	  information.	  Knowledge	  attribution	  based	  on	  motor	  control	  abilities	  that	  underlie	   successful	   navigation	   certainly	   counts	   as	   a	   useful	   way	   of	   flagging	   good	  sources	   of	   information.	   Successful	   navigators	   need	   to	   encode	   information	   that	   is	  constantly	   changing	   by	   eliminating	   noise	   and	   unreliably	   formed	   beliefs.	   The	  evidence	   suggests	   that	   humans	   and	   animals	   have	   a	   large	   repertoire	   of	   these	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  Success	  semantics	  depends	  on	  aggregation	  (because	  reliability	  depends	  on	  rate)	  and	  sources	  of	  information.	  Knowledge	  attributions	  are	  not	  based	  just	  on	  success	  (blind	  success)	   or	   just	   reliability	   (independently	   of	  motivation).	   Knowledge	   attributions,	  therefore,	  depend	  on	  success	   that	  manifests	   in	  reliably	  produced	  true	  belief	   in	   the	  context	  of	   specific	  epistemic	   inclinations	  of	  an	  agent.	  But	  how	  does	   this	  semantics	  fare	  against	  the	  alternative	  proposals?	  
	  We	   argued	   that	   Greco’s	   gambler’s	   case	   is	   not	   a	   case	   of	   knowledge.	   Our	   proposal	  accounts	   for	   this,	   because	   there	   are	  no	   fact-­‐involving	   aspects	   of	   the	   situation	   that	  could	   constitute	   a	   utility	   condition	   (i.e.,	   luck	   would	   do).	   However,	   many	   cases	   of	  animal	   knowledge	   are	   clearly	   within	   the	   scope	   of	   our	   proposal,	   and	   qualify	   as	  knowledge	  from	  epistemic	  ability	  and	  inclinations.	  Some	  highly	  sophisticated	  forms	  of	  knowledge,	  such	  as	  knowledge	  of	  syntax,	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  analogous	  to	  these	  forms	  of	   knowledge.	   So	   our	   proposal	   has	   the	   advantages	   of	  Greco’s	   naturalistic	   account,	  without	  the	  problems	  explained	  above.	  	  How	  about	  other	  forms	  of	  contextualism,	  besides	  Greco’s	  proposal?	  We	  shall	   focus	  on	   Jason	   Stanley’s	   (2005)	   account,	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   conciseness.	   The	   present	  proposal	  is	  contextualist	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  knowing	  information	  about	  facts	  and	  the	  truth-­‐conduciveness	   of	   beliefs	  will	   not	   suffice	   for	   knowledge	   attribution.	  One	   also	  needs	  to	  know	  two	  extra	  pieces	  of	  information:	  whether	  the	  reliable	  dispositions	  to	  produce	   true	   belief	   are	   attributable	   to	   the	   agent,	   and	  whether	   the	   agent	   had	   the	  inclinations	   to	   achieve	   true	   belief	   with	   respect	   to	   a	   specific	   epistemic	   task.	  Depending	  on	  the	  task,	  the	  standards	  of	  evaluation	  change,	  so	  this	  is	  one	  source	  of	  contextual	  variance.	  Another	  source	  of	  variability	  concerns	  the	  modal	  robustness	  of	  dispositions	   (they	   do	   not	   manifest	   necessarily	   in	   their	   consequents	   across	   all	  possible	  worlds).	   But	   instead	   of	   cashing	   out	   these	   contextual	   variants	   in	   terms	   of	  interests,	  we	  propose	  to	  cash	  them	  out	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  more	  familiar	  metaphysical	  
requirements	   for	   the	   manifestation	   of	   dispositions,	   which	   are	   compatible	   with	  contextualist	  interpretations.	  	  Thus,	  we	   think	  one	   can	  obtain	   very	   similar	   results	   to	   the	  ones	   Stanley	   reports	   by	  appealing	  to	  intuitions	  concerning	  success	  from	  ability,	  rather	  than	  by	  appealing	  to	  how	  high	  or	  low	  the	  practical	  stakes	  are.	  Consider	  the	  case	  of	  Hanna	  and	  Sarah	  who	  need	  to	  deposit	  a	  check	  in	  the	  bank.	  Yes,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  stakes	  drive	  the	  intuitions,	  but	  only	  in	  so	  far	  as	  we	  want	  Hanna	  and	  Sarah	  to	  succeed	  in	  an	  epistemic	  goal	  that	  involves	  a	  lot	  more	  than	  the	  mere	  fact	  that	  the	  bank	  will	  open.	  In	  particular,	  we	  want	  them	   to	   form	   a	   true	   belief	   that	   concerns	   their	   funds	   being	   available	   for	   a	   very	  important	  impending	  payment.	  This	  includes	  their	  abilities,	  inclinations	  and	  a	  utility	  condition	  that	  includes	  the	  bank	  being	  open.	  This	  is	  the	  main	  example	  discussed	  by	  Stanley	  and	  it	  seems	  that	  everything	  else	  he	  says	  about	  similar	  cases	  is	  compatible	  with	  our	  proposal.	  We	  think	  that,	  actually,	  the	  ‘success	  from	  ability’	  intuition	  does	  a	  better	   job	   in	   explaining	   the	   attributions	   that	   Stanley	  analyzes.	  And,	   as	  Greco	   says,	  success	   from	  ability	   also	   captures	   the	   ‘anti-­‐luck’	   and	   ‘ability’	   intuitions.	  Therefore,	  we	  believe	  that	  the	  success	  semantics	  approach	  we	  defend	  in	  this	  paper	  may	  be	  the	  best	   account	   not	   only	   of	   naturalized	   epistemic	   virtue	   but	   also	   of	   the	   semantics	   of	  knowledge	  attribution.	  	  	  	  
